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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Plaintiff-Respondant should be estopped 
from asserting title to certain property referred to herein 
as the "Hunt Property". 
2. The Plaintiff-Respondant should be estopped 
from asserting an objection to the sale by Defendant-Appellant 
of the property referred to herein as the "Hunt Property" 
to the Cross Plaintiff-Appellant. 
3. The Court erred in sustaining objections to 
evidence tending to show that Plaintiff-Respondant abandoned 
the subject property and his claim of any interest in it 
and that he should be estopped from asserting such a claim. 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to partition real property in 
which the title is held in joint tenancy and for dama8es 
by a third party who purchased the property from one of the 
joint tenants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case \vas tried to the Court. From a judgment 
for the Plaintiff, Cross Complainant and Defendant both 
appeal. 
ReLIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, VERE BECKSTROI1, seeks reversal of the 
judgoent and judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or 
that failing, a new trial. 
STATE11ENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, ~!ARION BECKSTROM, and Defendant, VERE 
BECKSTROM, arc brothers. (Tr. PI+O, LL22-2 3) 
In 19!+9, VERE and MARION, \vho hnd just come home 
from the service, purchased 80 acres in the area ncar Beryl, 
Utah (Tr. P40, LL21-23) often referred to by the parties as 
the "Hunt Property" or as the pnJjK~rly "on the desert", \vhic'· 
is the subject of this lawsuit. 
VERE ;md his \vi fe, EL IZAEETil, pRid the dm,•n payr~er 
of $2,000"00 out of their S3vings. (The transcript, P65, 
LL6, 7 & 13 S3)'S $1,/00.00 but cn•mscl n:pn.•senls that that 
-2-
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is an error in the transcript and the figure should be 
$12,000o00o See, for example, Deposition of Plaintiff, 
MARION BECKSTROH, P3, Ll6) was borrowed from ELIZABETH 
BECKSTROM's brother, RODNEY SNOW, (Tro P65, LLll-15) giving 
a mortgage, to secure the loan, on 25 acres of property 
owned by MARION together with some property adjacent to 
it mvned by VERE in Pine Valley, Utaho (Tro P65, LL19-20) 
MARION moved onto the 80 acres on the desert and 
attempted to farm it, while VERE operated the 25 acres of 
property in Pine Valley owned by !1ARION, together with 
property he owned himself in Pine Valley as well as some 
property he leased from his sister, also in Pine Valley. 
Thereafter, l1ARIO!l and VERE and VERE' s wife, 
ELIZABETH purchased an additional 80 acres "on the desert" 
referred to as the "LC?wis Property" \Jhich l1ARION also 
occupied and attempted to operate together with the Hunt 
Property. (Tr. P31, LL27-29) 
After attempting to operate the Hunt Property 
for approximately 10 years, and the Lewis Property for a 
portion cf that time, l1ARION abandoned both properties 
(Tro P31, L30; P32, LLl-2, 27-29) 
H'\RION paid none of the taxes on the Hw1t Property 
11hile re occupit:'d it and attcrnpte?d to farm it (TL P20, 
fl.S-9; 1'29, LL16-l8). They lvcre? all paid by 1/ERE BECKSTROMo 
Ii,•i tlwr did HARTON make any paymen Ls on the note to RODNEY 
-3-
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SNOW during those ten years. (Tr. P26, LL23-30; P27, Ll) 
It was not until MARION had abandoned both the 
Lewis Property and the Hunt Property that he made any payment 
whatever on the mortgage or on taxes. After he had abandoned 
the property, he made the final payment of approximately 
$1,500,00 to RODNEY SNOH which \vas needed to release the 
mortgage that was on his as well as VERE BECKSTROM's property 
in Pine Valley. (Tr. P27, LL2-15) 
In approximately November, 1959, after ~~RION 
had abandoned the Beryl property, VERE met MARION on the 
street in St. Gc>~>c-;;e and asked him j f he would pay the 
taxes on the Hunt Property. (Tr, 1'22, LL16-18; P29 LL 19-23) 
MAIUON refused to do so nne!, in fact, did not pay any taxes 
on the property llwreafter just as he had not prior thereto. 
(Tr. P45, LL23-25; P64, LLl-8) 
MARION ackno\vle<iged that he knew and unrlerstood 
that if ~xes were not paid, the property could be sold 
for back taxes by the county nnd that it 1-10nld be lost by 
him. (Tr. P30, LLl-13) 
Afl:er HARTON abzmdoned the lhmt and Lewis Propertv, 
the Lewis Property, according to ~~RION, was lost by foreclo• 
(Tc P32, LL28-29) and accorcling to VFRE, 1r1s sold to avoid 
[orecloc ure (Tr, P6l, LL'l-10). 
VERE, after i',\RTotl alJ,mJc,Jwd the l11111t Pn•p<'t-L)' 
and after he rc>fused lo pay any t.Jxc's on it, moved (lnto the 
-4-
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Hunt froperty and farmed it for approximately 2 years until 
he SJffered a severe stroke and \las unable to operate the 
property himself any longer, (Tr, P62, 1122-30; P63, LLl-6) 
lfuile operating the property, VERE drilled a well 
to replace one that had caved in while !1ARIO!l operated the 
property, That well cost approximately $2,300,00 which was 
paid entirely by VERE. (Tr. P68, LLl-8) 
After VERE suffered a stroke and was physically 
unable to operate the Hunt Property any longer, he caused 
it to be leased for approximately six years. (Tr. P41, 114-5) 
In 1972, VERE BECKSTR0!1 entered into a sale agreement 
with Cross Plaintiff-Appellant, NORMAND LAUB, to sell the 
Hunt Property for $20,000.00. (Tr. P42, 118-10 and Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 14). 
In 1974, Plaintiff, l1ARION BECKSTROM, filed the 
instant case naming V£RE RECKSTROl1 and NORMAND D. LAUB as 
Defc=ndants and NORMAlJD D. LAUE filed a Cross-Complaint against 
VJmr: BECKSTR01'1 and his wife, ELIZABETH. 
ARGU!1ENT 
I, The Plaintiff-Respondant should be estopped 
[rom ;sserling title to certain property referred to herein 
•1s f·he "Hunt Property". 
i'J.,\RION ;cmd VERE BECKSTR0!1 1vere brothers, Hhen 
l-11\P.Iotl rt' turned from Lhe service in 19!+9, VERE, Hho \vas 
J:nrric·d to ELfi:ABETH, made the dm-m payment of $2,000o00 on 
:m 80 ;Jere tract of ground on the desert near Beryl, Utah. 
'l'hcy rai:;cd the baLmce of $12,000,00 to purchase the property 
-5-
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by borrowing it from ELIZABETH 1 s brother, Dr. RODNEY SN0\1, 
This was done, at least partially, if not pri~arily, to 
provide a home (Tr. P72, LL12-24) and an occupation for 
MARION, but also to earn a profit, according to the testimony 
of VERE and ELIZABETH. To secure the loan from SNOW, a 
mortgage was placed upon 25 acres of property owned by 
l1ARION, inherited from his parents, together with land 
adjacent to it, owned by VERE, 
While ELIZABETH taur;ht school, VERE operated the 
Pine Valley property belonging both to himself and to MARIOII, 
and MARION moved onto the 80 acres of desert land referred 
to as the "Hunt P r<1pe rty". 
Thereafter, an additional 80 acres, referred to as 
the "Lewis PJ:operty" \vas purchased for ]'!ARION to operate 
to(',ether \vith the Hunt Property JT1:1king a total of 160 acres 
on the desert. 
l'!ARION, hmmver, spent much of his time, according 
to his ~stimony, working for the rai1road, sorting potatoes 
and attf'nding "G.I. School" (Tr. P20, LL18-7.2) uhich had not~ 
to do with making productive the 160 acres he was supposed 
to be L1rrning. 
After ten years on the prope1:ty, durinr; which tine 
he did not contribute illljlhing lo ihc~ payr:~,cnts on tlw mortg.~ 
and did not contribute nnylhing to the payn1ents on !H'-'Pcrl\' 
taxes, t1ARION abandoned both the Hunt :md the Lch•is P ropL>rti 
-6-
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During that time, VERE, who was operating the small 
acreage at Pine Valley, part of which was owned by him and 
part ~ MARION, while ELIZABETH, his wife, taught school, 
paid all of the payments on the mortgage except the final 
one of approximately $1,500.00 and paid all of the taxes on 
the Hunt and Lewis Property. MARION freely acknowledged that 
VERE and ELIZABETH made those payments. 
In 1959, when MARION left the property near Beryl, 
he did so proclaiming in no uncertain terms that he wanted 
nothing more to do >vi th farming the property and that it 
1vas no good and that he wasn't interested in preserving it 
by even paying the taxes on it, (Tr. P22, LL27-29; P22, 
LL26-28; P26, Ll9; P29, LLll-15; P48, LL7-9; P62, LL12-l3; 
P67, LL22-25) 
Hhile }!ARION was operating the property, the Hell 
caved in and \Jas not repaired or rep laced by l1ARION, so that 
after he abandoned the property, VERE, who then began to 
operate the 1!1mt Pt-operty himself, was forced to drill a 'dell 
on the ~operty at a cost of $2,300.00 which he also paid 
entirely himself. (P68, LLl-6) 
Ho,vever, of great si[,'11ificance at the time of 
:L'Il<LUN's ab;:mdoning the Hunt Properly is his concurrent 
,lb: ;ldom;,0 nt of t-he Lcc1vis ProperLy and 1-ihat happ2ned to it. 
He h,-ul h 0 en operating both 80 a_cre paccels jointly \vhen he 
;:;ave up and P10vcr1 off. T110U(ih the Court sustained some 
-7-
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objections to questions concerning the Lewis Property and 
thereby prevented a complete disclosure of the evidence whic' 
would, in the Defendant-Appellant's opinion, have supported 
the ~sition that there was an estoppel in pais, i.e. that 
MARION is estopped from asserting title to the property in 
question, some limited evidence concerning it was admitted 
and it is significant. 
MARION testified that when he abandoned the two 
properties, both Lc1vis and Hilll t, he had a buyer for them by 
the name of JOE ROMERO, "before the Le1vis place went back". 
(Tr. P23, LL3-6) He stated that VERE refused to sell the 
properties and re: ,<JcJed that one 1'1R. LEWIS did foreclose on 
the parcel 1vhich he had sold to !1ARION and VERE. (Tr. P32, 
1128-29) 
V"~RE, hmvever, testified that the Lewis Property 
was indeed sold to avoid foreclosure to JOE ROI'\ERO at that t 
(Tr. PS2, 1124-30; P53, LLl-8) l1ARION had '-lashed his hancls 
of the lvhole affCJir, cxcept to suggest thilt JOE ROl'TI.:RO I·JaS 
intcrcsterl in put~clLJsing the 1)roperLy. VERE insisted JOE 
ROHERO only had nn i11terest in pcn·chasing L11e Lewis Property, 
not the Hunt Property. (Tr. P53, LL3-8) 
It wonld appc:1r logical, sitlL'c:' the Lr'His l'rl!pcrty 
\,•as sold to RO!·mP.O accnnlinp; to Vt:RE, that it .:.lS <1une to 
avoid the threat of frHcc]nc;uJe by U:ULS .mel Lo nvoid the 
-8-
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sometimes devastating effects on VERE and his wife as well 
as 11ARION, of a foreclosure proceeding. 
However, the Hunt Property posed an entirely 
different situation to VERE and ELIZABETH. 
To that time in 1959, they had paid all the payments 
on the mortgage and on taxes themselves. There remained 
only $1,500.00 left in order to own it free and clear. There 
was not the pressing need to sell it to save it from foreclosure 
that there was with the Lewis Property and they did not want 
to sell it - still believing, in spite of MARION's poor track 
record over the past 10 years, that the property had some 
value. 
Had MARION had the interest, at that time, in the 
property and particularly in selling it, that he displayed 
14 years later 1"hen this suit \Jas filed, he could have filed 
a partition action then to force "an accounting" or to force 
sale. 
Obviously, however, he did not because he considered 
the 1 and I,Jorthless and even more important had contributed 
nothing to acquiring it or preserving it to that point. He 
does no1v aq~ue (?~~_facto that the proceeds from the Pine 
Valley property, part of which belonged to him, went to the 
paymr>nt of the I/1Cnt p,niie and tAxes on the Hunt Property. 
ll<hiCVer, it is just as arguable that the funds used to pay 
the taxes and mortgage are as much or more the result of the 
-9-
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hard work and efforts of VERE as they were the fruits of that 
bare land. 
MARION did not produce anything to contribute to 
the taxes and mortgage payments off of a total of about 4 
times more land than that which VERE was operating. 
l1ARION abandoned the property, let the Lewis Properc 
be either sold or foreclosed upon with no argument or interes 
in its disposition. 
l1ARION did pay the final payment of approximately 
$1,500.00 on the mortgage, but in spite of his present 
protestations to the contrary, it is apparent that he did so 
primarily to re?move the C?ncuf'lbr;mce n~;ainst his Pine Valley 
Property rather than to preserve the Hunt Property. 
Furthennore, shortly after abnnclrmi ng the p:cope?rty, 
VEl~ confronted l·!ARTON and, nfter ten ye;ns of paying the 
taxes on the Hunt Property himself ilS IJe>ll as the taxes on tr 
Pine Valley property, part of which \vas mmced by J.1/\RION, 
asked l'!.ARION if he \•!ilS z:,oi ng to pay the t:1xe s 1-Jhich lit>re due 
on the H1mt Property, 
of fact, did not! 
unrlerstood Lhat if !<"xes \.'ere not p<lid, the pl·opr'rLy could 
;>nd 1-muld be taken by the Lndt18 :111Lhol'ity in lieu of taXI'S. 
Nc>v'crthele~~s, he ('ill1''r di.d nol_- t',lr-r-', 1:hich is the cnntcill-it'·-
of the DcfcnrLmt-,\ppell;mt, or: he ,.,,,,]d not pay tl1e l:1X<'S, 
In either event, lwc1 it not bec_•n for: VC:f<b:'s curr1ing to the 
-10-
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rescue ~ain and paying those taxes for the next 14 years, 
the county would, no doubt, have taken the property and MARION 
would have had nothing to be claiming now! 
VERE, on the other hand, assumed the burden of paying 
taxes from 1959 to 1974, in addition to having paid them the 
previous ten years, assumed the expense and obligation of· 
drilling a well at a cost of $2,300.00 to himself, maintained 
water rights, leased the property vlhen he was himself incapacitated 
physically and did all of that which was necessary to retain 
and maintain the property under the honest impression that 
~~RION had abandoned any interest or claim in the property. 
Again, it is extremely important to note, that had 
VERE not done these things, there \vould have been no property 
to sell to the Cross-CofTlplainant, NORMAND LAUB and there 
lWUld l1ave been no property for MARION to now claim is half 
his! 
Furthermore, VERE, after operating the property 
for a couple of years and then becoming incapacitated physically 
by a severe stroke, leased it for several years thereafter, 
finally sold the property for the sum of $20,000.00, a figure 
\·;hich Cross CompLJinant-Appellant's expert witness testified 
was a fair and reasonable value for the property when it was 
sold in 1972. ('fro P96, LL23-26) 
'l1w Defcndant-·AppelLmt, from the time a lfotion 
to Amend his Answer to allc~e an affirmative defense, to-wit, 
-11-
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that the Plaintiff be estopped from claiming an interest 
in the subject property, has maintained and attempted to she. 
that an estoppel in pais existed in spite of the Court's 
refusal to even consider that principal of law, as will be 
more fully reviewed in paragraph III infra. 
In 1880, the United States Supreme Court announce( 
perhaps the leading case pertaining to Equitable Estoppel 
or Estoppel in Pais as it applies to a situation similar ~ 
the situation that exists in the instant case. The facts 
in that case, Dickerson vs. ~~~~o~~. 100 U.S. 578, 25 L. 
Ed. 618, were that one MORTON purchased land by Warranty 
Deed from JOHN VLTtlE and his v1ife, Si\IZAH, daughter of 
MICAJAH CHANCEY, 11ho had cn-med it until his death. ]·lORTON, 
after occupying the land for several years, learned of the 
existence of a brother of SARAH KLINE and a son of MICAJAH 
CHANCEY, one EDl·JL:ND C!IANO:Y, and IHote to him asking if he 
made any claim to the Lmd. EDl-!lltW C][i\!JCEY 1-note back to h; 
sister, SARAH, saying he di~d not 1:1ake a cl :~im and di savowin,; 
any intention of ever making a claim to the land. 
The.ceafter, hm-;cv0r, J·:JJl'diND CIIANCJcY did 1~."ke a cl 
and con veycd by Q11i t-Cl aim need the p: npert y rn one Ill CKf:F~ 
1vho then filed a suit for ejC'ctnir>nt :~g:dnst: il1e !kft·:1d:mts, 
COLGROVE, successor to ;;OKJ'ON. 
The SuprerT:e Collrl of the l:ni i cd Stat:c·,; d,•,_·i,:L·d 
against the Plaintiff, fi11ding ih:Jt.: ]J,, \·::1s l'stoppcd l)y his 
-12-
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deeds and ~tions from later asserting a title or claim 
to the property he had once disavowed. 
The Court reflected upon the effect upon MORTON 
of CHANCEY's letter disclaiming an interest: 
"He was lulled into security. He took no 
measures to perfect title, nor to procure 
any redress from the Klines." 
The Court then proceeded to elaborate upon the 
principal involved: 
"The estoppel here relied upon is known 
as an equitable estoppel or estoppel in 
pais •••• The vital principal is, that he 
who, by his language or conduct, leads 
another to do \-Jhat he would not othen1ise 
have done, shall not subject such person 
to loss or injury by disappointing the 
expectations upon Hhich he acted." 
The Court adds: 
"This remc:;dy is al\/ays so applied as to 
promote the ends of justice. It is 
.lv-11T;:!hJc_o_n_ly-for-p-rot:CC:tTon, and cannot 
l1c= usPd as a \·/c,,pon of a~>saul t. It accomplishes 
i~hat \·,>hich on::;ht to be done beU·;ccn <nan and 
11.·m, and it j s not pC'rmi tted to go b<2yond 
lhis limit. Jt: is akin t:o t:he principal 
involved in the limitation of actions, and 
,',J<'S i ls ',-;o,-k of justice ;1nd repose '·;hC're 
ill<' sl :Jl<ll:C e:"''not: be in\·Oked." (E,nphasis 
.\dded) 
This q11olc, rc'f<·,·ring to Lhe l'nds of justice as it 
it, :~nd lht·n hnving rc=fu::L·u Co pay :my tCJxes thereafter to 
-13-
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preserve, all because he did not consider the property to be 
of any value at that time, should not, at this late date, be 
able to come in 14 years later, when historical circumstances 
have created value that did not appear to be there previously 
i.e. the increased scarcity of water and consequent increase 
in value of water, and exploit and take advantage of VERE's 
foresight and VERE' s efforts and expenses in preserving and 
maintaining the property. 
Of course, one might argue that in the Dickerson 
case there was a letter from CHANCEY disav01ving any claim to 
the property 'vhich constitutes a writing and that SJch a 
,-.~ri ting is not present in the instant case. The Court, in 
the Dickerson case, hmvever, cited a case [:0-t:._o~ vs. fn)(_on, 
38 Mich 159 wherein the Court said: 
"The CoPlplainant may have estopped himself 
without any positive agre~mcnt if he 
intcmtionally led Defendants to do or 
abstain Irmn doing anything involving 
labor or expenditure to a11y considerable 
amount by giving Llll'I~ to ,_,,1,~cersLllld tl1at they 
should be relieved [ruP1 t_hc bunlc'n of the 
mol-tga,gcs "" 
action, may causQ a s~c-und lo t-ely upun that action e1nd .JS" 
appeared to he a distinct Jis.I\'< 1l uf :ii1Y i,ltcrc·st ~n ihe 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hunt Property by his brother, MARION. l1ARION had left the 
property, stated he wanted nothing to do with it, had similarly 
abandoned companion property and allowed it to either be sold 
to prevent foreclosure or it had been foreclosed and had refused 
to pay taxes. VERE then went to much labor and expense and 
assumed the responsibilities of paying taxes and the other 
concurrent responsibilities of ownership of land in order to 
preserve that property believing l1ARIO!I would never express 
an interest in it thereafter. 
The Dickerson case Supra, also cited Harkness vs. 
Toulmin, 25 Mich 80 and Truesdail vs. \~ard, 24 Mich 117 and 
made this further comment: 
"There is no rule more necessary to enforce 
good faith than that which compels a person 
to abstain from asserting claims which he 
has induced others to ~_l.l2_S~ he. 11ould not 
rely on. The rule does not rest on the 
assuJc,ption that he has obtained any personal 
gain or advantage, but on the fact that he 
has induced others to act in such a manner 
that they will be seriously prejudiced if 
he is allo,·;ed to fail in carrying out \·!hat 
he has Pncouraged t:hem to expect." 
In the p1-c0cnt case, VERE BECKSTROM relied upon the 
acts dnd sta! cmcnts of his brother, 11ARION, and supiJosed that 
he ,,udc> ro clnim and had no interest in the Hunt Property. 
feelyi ng upon that, VERE operated the property himself for 2 
year.s, including ;1ssuming all the costs and expenses of 
:'aintaining and i1·1proving it, leased it for several years 
after he was physically incapacitated from operating it 
hitnself and ultimately sold the property for $20,000.00. 
-15-
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Now, however, MARION makes a claim to that property, 
and as a result of the finding of the Court below that MARio:; 
is entitled to a one-half interest in that property, VERE is 
faced with a potential claim of up to $35,000.00 by the Cross 
Co~plainant-Appellant for damages, based upon the current 
value of the property of $75,000.00, since, under the ruli~ 
of the lm-Jer court, VERE only had a one-half interest in the 
property to convey. This hardly seems a just reward for his 
faith, dili8ence and sacrifice in attempting to preserve the 
property by paying taxes upon it and ~aintaining and impro~ 
the property over the many yl'ars t l1at he did so, all at a 
t·h1e \vhcn lll\RlON 1• .d no faith in i 1: and had dL;avowed :my 
\villingness to a~si.st in the p:l)'ill·nt of the taxes or :lny oLh 
('(l[ 1,,>11t t11;tl Just i l_·e 
'\·.':1:-:; i 11('1 i 1i1'<l I o 
T I I r i_ s ( i lt (' ~ ~~-) r· i 
11. · d i ,,~ l n 1-\ · 1 i < 
,} '"IS) ·-til-: lt_'t'<-; ] i -1 I~ (J 1j,) i • 'd 1 y 
lJ) 1:y I 11(~ l ~ ~ -, Ull · 11 t 1 
f), i, 1l·l ~Ll1·s, ,·PI~, Ct!i1';1 r:t'r--ing 
J .: 1):::L' Of j i ,(? '·: j t:··llllt 111j t'l 'i I"! l1 I t\_·1_- ill(~ 
l'()J-1:;~;· ~(~'.; (1]) J1)('' l'1;1r·t ('If ill\:(',, 
1
11,,j;l'lj)1-, 
I 111 • J i I 1 i ) ( \ ~ ( l d t l.) d i I I 1 t 
concl11'-.;i tll1 uf ,,ly l1 1-c ,_ll{'J·n o 11 
-he 
11tis, .:;_,:lin, is c:<Jctly illt' ·:ir 11 .liic•n that 11:-1s 
cxi,;tcd in Lhe inst.mt <'.J:;c. 
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fact, relied upon the representation of MARION and has 
certainly taken steps that he would not have taken had he 
believed that his brother, t1ARION, claimed an interest in 
the property. It would, no doubt, have been very easy for 
VERE to have obtained the signature of MARION on the Contract 
of S:>le for $20,000.00 in 1972, which '"as then the admitted 
value of the property, if, in fact, MARION had, as he now 
insists, asked VERE to sell the property on a previous 
occassion once, only 2 years earlier. VERE did not seek 
HARION' s signature because he did not believe that MARION 
claimed any interest in the property, or that having failed 
to contribute to its maintenance, was not entitled to any 
interest, even if he did claim it. 
'tne ])i_cv':.erson case ~ra further commented in 
ce f<'rence to Another case, ~v-~ns vs. !:)_f0'der, 64 t1o. 516: 
"But the SuprePlC~ Court of the state held 
t·h3t 1-Jhc,-e they stcmd silently by for years 
\-lhi_l c the occup:mt 11as making valu:1ble and 
l:1st ing jp·,provc:,nent·s on the property nnd 
redrc-ming it from the lien of the m1ccstor's 
,],-~)lS, his heirs v.-o11ld he c•:;topped frnm 
aftcn-,'anls asserting tl1eir claim." 
Jn llulst<'en vs. 'I11_t2lllE_S()_~, 169 N.H. 2d 554, the Court 
,.q,,wiai,,s the ru]c involved herein as follows: 
"One 1-;ho, by his u_-nunciaLinn or disclaimer 
0 f 1 it l0 co p r-opcrty has i nduccd another 
1 o 1wli L'VC :1nd :1ct thereon to his prejudice 
is <-:;iuppc•d to :JC:SL·rt such title. L_uc_:~ vs. 
ll<l rt. 5 r (Jh';} !+ l 5, 4 J 9; l~Qo_l-:~1)_ vs. ~1c_I2_owe_!_l, 
Jl!l-ful:a :286, 2'10, 119 N.IJ. 702, 703, 3l 
LI\1\NS, 176 (Ti t:l c Qui ctcd in Plaintiff based 
-17-
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on estoppel against Defendant); Koep vs, 
~lSp, 146 Iowa 179, 182, 123 N.W. 174, 
; Thorn vs. Thorn, 208 Minn. 461, 294 
N.H. "Zi-bl," 464 (facts similar to case et 
bar)" 
The Holsteen case Supra quotes from 28 Am Jur 2d, 
Estoppel and Waiver, Section 81, Page 723 as follows: 
"Although the courts are inclined to be 
SOillC'\vhat more reluctant to give effect to 
estoppels when they effect the title to 
real estate and in other instances, the 
rule is generally well settled in the 
modern law that the title to land or real 
property may pass by an equitable estoppel, 
which is effectual to take the title to 
land from one person and invest it in 
another 1vhere j~sUce rC'~i__Ees that such 
<-l~tj_2~ j:J_e__J'l_oi1~· (Emphasls Adaeo) 
Defend:mt-Appl'lLmt has been unable to find where 
the Supreme Court of Utah has dealt with this prl'cise iss~ 
previously, however, Thorn vs. :r}-l_Cl_~, 208 Minn. /+61, 294 N.H. 
/+61, cited in the 1-!oJ:str_~:Q. c:1se Sup~~ pertained to a factual 
situation, that in C!ll cssc:nt:ials, is SLmilar to the insL1nt 
case. 
/\ll.THUR 'tdOH, the Plaintiff, :md lil~;\iiK 't'liOH subjcc·t to a 
ttlortt>'i~C in the ,i!JOlmt of $7,001L00 to his, \JILtL\11 C, lllil::' 
bux l:o \·.hich i\l~TIJIIR THtll'1, tlH' l'l:tintiff, did nut h.t'JC ,c·c,,· 
\Jarr;mty Deed t:o CLJFFORD Tllllti, his ,oun, t:hc fl,•ft·nd.mt L11 ' 
-18-
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The Deed to Arthur and to FRANK was recorded at 
the same time as the Deed from FRANK to CLIFFORD, but the 
name, "ARTHUR" had been, it was later determined, erased 
from rr by that time, by an unknown party, so that on the 
record, ARTHUR, the Plaintiff, appeared to have no claim 
to the land. 
ARTHUR and FRANK had earlier delivered a mortgage 
to their mother on the property for $7,000.00 to replace 
the ori8inal one from HILLIAM. CLIFFORD leased the farm 
from ARTHUR and FRANK :md coJTlmenced to operate it for 4 years 
until he reC'cived a Deed to the property from his father, 
FI\ANK. 
A title company noted, at that tiJTle, hmvever, that 
ARTHUR was listed as a JT!Ortgager and wanted a Quit-Claim 
l)ced from him, ,.Jhich he then refused to give. It was also 
at ll1at tiPle thAt it w:1s discovered that the Deed had been 
n'cocclcd 1-1ith his n:;me erased, but still delectable on it. 
\.Then the n10r 1 ~;n2_;e for $7,000.00 from ARTHUR ::md 
;. :' :'<. '1:1d C<lr·lier bccOtl1e d11r;, Plaintiff, AR1llUR THOM, told 
il.c •l)!'l:>'!~"e's srm,. oo"he could not do a thing CJbout the 
·~nl'"~:~c :md lw had :1ll he could h:mdle at home." 
Th:1t 1 :m~~~wge '"as very sintilar in context to the 
',i :; .1 1:111 ,1 , y, .~ 1 ~ n he "'1i rl, "·.:ell, he (VEI<I~ rlECKSTR0!1) just 
·':Lr·d if p:tid :1ny i.dXCS and I says, 'no, I didn't. I 
-19-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
haven't got any money to pay taxes with now on that group 
(sic) on the desert"'. (Tr. P22, LL16-18) 
Again, MARION agreed under cross examination by 
Defendant-Appellant's counsel '"hen he "'as asked •••• "at that 
time you told him (VERE BECKSTROM) that the property "'as 
worthless and you couldn't make it and you weren't going 
to farm it anymore and you didn't want anything to do with 
it, didn't you?" (Tr. P29, LLll-15). MARION agreed that 
was true. (Tr. P29, LlS) 
VERE BECKSTROM recalls llARION' s 'vords as, after 
he had asked J>lARION if he wanted to pay taxes on the property 
"to hell with it---let the state take it and pay it off". 
(Tr. P48, LL7-9 c'nd P64, LL2-3) 
It is clear that the thrust of 111\RION's statement 
and his intent in 1959 when asked to pay taxes on the Hunt 
Property was c>ssentially the same as AK'JllUR TIJON's staLcment 
in Lhe Thom vs. Tlwm c;,:;e, ~u_pr-~. l·illen asked to pay off Lhe 
:\RTllUR 'Ji!Ol'l .. ,.,de othte[ :;i,,lilRr J:cprcsenlations to 
;\RlilUR l!JOH took certain sll'pS Lo t .1lce over Lhe Linn :md 
The Court: note' d: 
"Plaintiff, on Lhe othl'r hand, by his 
conduct as ':ell as l1y l1is \·,ords, <~ppruved 
-20-
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and acquiesced in Clifford's assertions 
of mvnership. He claimed no title after 
1932, nor any right to rent or the crops. 
He did not concern himself about taxes in-tere~t or payment, on the mortgage, upkeep 
and ~mprovements of the premises or any of 
the things in which an mvner of the property 
would be interested." 
In the instant case, MARION BECKSTROM, after 1959, 
did rot interest himself in the payment of the taxes, payment 
for the drilling of the well, or any of the other matters 
that are associated with ownership of property. There is 
some testimohy by him and his wife that he contacted VERE 
BECKTROM at least on one occassion and suggested that there 
Has a buyer available for the property by the name of 
CARDNER, but thAt is disputed by the Defendant and even, at 
best, C~ccording to M/1.RION BECKSTROJ1's mm testimony, amounted 
only to a statemc2nt that GARDNER was available or interested 
in P""c"',asing the property. That could be interpreted as a 
lnolhcrly effort to Assist his brother, VERE, if he was looking 
lur a ruccr.aser as casi ly as it could be interpreted as a 
r, ,,, ·,.·c·d cL1 i m to 01mership in the property. He certainly did 
;,,,; J,ing ,,J·e :,nd ,•vcn by his o1·m r·ustiTnony did not object 
r o ;],c :;nid C\Rii'IER. 
"'r"he clniPJ of estoppel rc•sts upon Plaintiff's 
dic;C'l:lil,;r'l. of :1ll title and interest in the 
fan~ :md his consent that Clifford might 
-21-
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take over the farm under any arrangement 
which he could make by which Clifford 
and his wife were influenced to deal with 
the property in the belief that they were 
the owners thereof sofar as Plaintiff 
was concerned, to continue in actual 
possession of the farm, to acquire Frank 
V. Thorn's title, and to expend large 
sums of money for the payment of taxes, 
principal, and interest on the mortgage, 
repairs, improvements, and upkeep of 
the premises so that under the circumstances 
it would be unjust now to permit Plaintiff 
to assert title." 
Certainly, again, that statement pertains and re& 
precisely to the :instant case. The Defendant, VERE BECKSTRr 
and his wife, ELIZABETH, relied upon the representations mac 
by MARION, treated the property as their own for several ye2 
to '"hich they n:>ceived no objection from MARION, and then 
ultimately lvhen VERE had t:;rown old nnd lvas unable to oper;;c 
or lease the property himself, contracted to sell the prope 
Unfortunately for them, therc~1fter, the vnlue of the l·later, 
not the farm it.'"~lf, but the \l<cter, bec:l;;·,e considerably rlOc. 
intC'rC'st in the property. 
invested his ,,,,mey in :11:ell :•nd all ihc •JllHcr c>-lwl<:il'S :mJ 
~Ji th a li abi lily COllll' j_ V:Jh ly dS ]) i ,•;h 'lo; $ ·35, l)lJ0, 00 if the 
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Cross Complainant is successful in his appeal. 
The Thorn case, again on page 464 meets that very 
situation with these words: 
"TI1e vital principal is that he who by 
his language or conduct leads another to do 
what he would not otherwise have done, 
shall not subject such___r_erson to loss or 
injury by_~appoint~ the expectations 
~~n which he acted. Such a change of 
position is sternfY forbidden. It involves 
fraud and falsehood, and the law abhors 
both. This remedy is alwa;rs to be applied 
as_!Q___promote the ends of JUStice." 
(Emphasis Added) 
Another very important point made by the Thorn case 
and which is an almost identical situation to the present 
case, is found in these words: 
"If Plaintiff had done nothing at all 
with respect to the mortgage, which his 
words and conduct showed was his intention, 
he vJOuld have lost the land anyway. Instead 
of letting the land go by foreclosure, he 
consC'nted to the taking over by Clifford, 
"'110, relying on his \·JOrds and conduct 
\·.Thi ch continuC'd throughout the pt'ri od 
l>om 1932 to the coimnencclllent of this 
"cti_on, acted thereon and changed his 
position to his prejudice." 
Tn dw present ca,;e, had the Defcmdant-Appr>llant 
,''Cili'J·iy, ll.\inUN \·!Ould have lost his inLerest by virtue of the 
cill·1Ly L"king t·he lno 1,l-'rly for that failure to pay the taxes • 
. ;;:•in, this is ;,n id,·nt·i.cal situ:11 ion to th:1t in the Thorn 
Tlw Court Lhcre fuund lhat undC'r those circu!'lstances, 
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the Plaintiff, ARTHUR THOM, was estopped to assert title, 
If justice be done, the Court here can do no less 
than reach the same conclusion. 
II. That the Plaintiff-Respondant should be estopp 
from asserting an objection to the sale by Defendant-Appel! 
of the property referred to herein as the "Hunt Property" to 
the Cross Plaintiff-Appellant. 
Without belaboring the facts or the situation as 
described in the brief heretofore, and if the Court were not 
to accept the position that MARION BECKSTROM is estopped fro-
claiming any title to the property, the interest of justice 
would certainly dictate that he is, at the very least, estop, 
from objecting to the sale of the property '"hich was made by 
VERE BECKS'fROH to the Cross Complainant-Appellant, NORHAND D. 
LAUB. 
!11\RION BECKSTROl1, in his testimony and in the test 
of his wife FAYE BECKSTROH, represented that on at least t\·cO 
occassions he proposed to VERE BECKSTROH that the property . 
sold. The first '"as in 1959 right flfter he had abandoncod t' 
property. Thcore is dispute that he proposed se11ing t:hco Hun· 
Property but that, in fact, he only proposed sel1 ing tlw Jp .. 
Property, but be thilt as it mRy, even if 111\RION BECKSTROH's 
version of the circu~stances were to be accepted, he WRS, ~ 
fact suggesting, requesting and ngrceing to tllc sale of the 
Hunt Property at that time. 
A8ain, in 1970, accucJing to the LcstiJ1C'l1Y of !lAF' 
BECKSTROH's wife, FAYE BECKSTROM, she conveyed 11 su/~L,cstion 
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to the Defendant-Appellant, VERE BECKSTROM, that the property 
be sold to a "MR. GARDNER". 
In view of the two representations referred to above, 
if they were, in fact, made, that the property be sold, certainly 
VERE BECKSTROM was entitled to believe that his brother, 
MARION, if he did, in fact, have a viable claim to the property, 
l·oanted to sell the property. In fact, under 11ARION's version 
of the circumstances, it was only VERE that did not wish 
to sell it. Therefore, if VERE later changed his mind and 
found a buyer, he is certainly justified in assuming that he 
was acting with the approval and the consent of his brother, 
MARION. 
There is not question that in 1972, when the property 
Has sold to LAUB, that it vJas sold at a reasonable value. 
'TI1e only testimony in the record is that of an independant 
~rpraiser and expert witness who testified that the value of the 
p1:operty was $~0, 000,00, the amount for ''hich it \vas sold by 
'IU<.E !1ECKSTHOM to NORl"'AND D, LAUB. 
Consequently, the Defendant-Appellant, would respectfully 
.,,,]J,,it that if tlw Court is not persuaded that the Plaintiff-
;:;,,.,pnndnnt, 1!/\RION Bb~CKSTROM is estopped from claiming any 
i 11 iJ· 1:1.:'St 11hatcver i.n the property, he is at least estopped from 
Jl!Y.V a•;;.;crling an object ion to the sale of the property and 
·hould he 0ntitlcd only to one-half of the proceeds of that 
;nle less perhnps, zm adjustment for the relative investments 
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made in the property by the Plaintiff-Respondant and the 
Defendant-Appellant. 
III. That the Court below erred in sustaining objec: 
to eJidence tending to show that Plaintiff-Respondant abandc-· 
the subject property and his claim of an interest in it and 
that he should be estopped from asserting such a claim, 
The Defendant-Appellant, VERE BECKSTROM, upon 
substituting counsel in the case, filed a lfotion to Amend hL 
Ans,.;er to allege, pursuant to the statutes of the State of r· 
the ~firmative defense of estoppel. 
The Plaintiff had filed a Motion for Partial Surrino: 
Judr;ment and Defendant-Appellant filed a Memorandum in Oppos: 
to that Hotion for Partial S1..n11mary Judgment, discussing, in 
detail, t11e principal of C>quitable estoppel or 0stoppel in F 
as it pcrlains to the instant case, 
Thonsh the Hotion Lo Anwnd Ans1·1ex by the Defendanc-
Appellant -.-;os filed on the 2nd day of !·larch, 1977, it \·!as cc 
heard by Lhe Court 1111 ti 1 the day ,; (' t for i_ria 1, to-wit lr3rch 
15, 19/7. 
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even having heard any evidence whatever on the issue. 
Furthermore, during the trial, it later became apparent that 
the Court had neither read nor considered the Defendant-
Appellant's Me~orandum pertaining to the principal of equitable 
estoppel or estoppel in pais when the Court said, upon a reference 
being made to the Memorandum by counsel, "Well, I don't see 
any Memorandum. There is nothing before me on that. I am at 
the trial right now." (Tr. P74, 111-3) After a short colloquy 
between the Court and counsel for Defendant-Appellant, the Court 
stated again, obviously without having read or considered the 
Defendant-Appellant's brief on the ~atter, "Hell, I don't agree, 
Com1sel, but go ahead and ask your question. It might be 
quicker to do that than to argue it." (Tr. P74, 1128-30) 
Immediately thereafter, when the Defendant-Appellant atte~pted 
to pursue the issue, the Court sustained an objection to any 
reference to the Lewis Property sunmarily cutting off any 
fnrther evidence which counsel for the Defendant-Appellant 
:rC'prC'sen ted ,,muld delllOnstrate MARION's attitudes towards the 
J:qqt P t'operly :'nd tend to sho'v , __ -hether or not an l3stoppel in 
p:1i .s h:1d, in fact, occuru•d LC8arLling the Hunt Property. 
Thcre3fter, upon the conclusion of the evidence, 
"''HI t1pnn time for ~~rgur,-,ent, though it is not recorded, the 
Cutn·t r·ef1lsc>d 1·o pennit counc;el for Defendant-Appellant, 
VEPE BFCKSTROM, to even argue or discuss the theory of equitable 
est<;ppel. 
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The. Court then, upon motion of Plaintiff-Respondant' 
counsel to strike the defense of equitable estoppel, immediate 
granted it without any argument whatever being permitted, 
(Tr. Pl02, LL12-16) 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court below 
was disinclined from the very commencement of the trial to e'.' 
consider the merits of a defense based upon the theory of an 
equitable estoppel. Yet, in failing to consider the said ~~ 
in failing to admit evidence to support said defense and in 
striking said defense and thereafter finding that the Plaintif 
Respondant, MARION BECKSTROM, did in fact have a one-half 
interest in the subject property, and finding that the Defend: 
Appellant, is liable to the Cross Complainant-Appellant, for 
damaEes, the Court is subjecting the Defendant-Appellant to 
An inequitnble, and unjust penalty for his having had the 
foresight and the \vi.lling1:1ess to expend funds, lime and eHoc 
of his o1vn to tl1c prescrvaUon of the subject property from 
an ultimate tax sAle. 
S]H)Ulcl J·he Cross C< ·1plainant-.\ppelLont be SllCCcssfr 
in his appeAl, thot P'-''ltll.ty upon l"he De[cnd:mt-flppe] J :111t coli1 
not b' Ji,'J·ely a loss of tl1e bill :1nce of the pi1Y"~' nts suppo,;cri 1 
dne Def,·rl<hnt-.\ppc•l] .;t!t under the conl r:l<:t 11i th Cr·o:os Col<~pl.c" 
Appellant as the Court belmv nJlC'd, hut cvcn ns ,nuch :1s an 
Affirmative n\,,ard of up to $;>5,000.00 oc $35,000,00 clepcncl 
upon this Court's ultimate disposition nf Ccoss CN,1pli1inant-
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Appellant's appeal. Certainly, the only person who put any 
money into the property in the first instance, i.e. the 
Defendant-Appellant, should not be required to enrich another, 
1vhen all he did \vas rely upon statements and representations 
made by MARION, the Plaintiff-Respondant herein, 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court below 
erred i_n striking the defense of equitable estoppel, which 
lhe Di~fcnd:cmt-Appel]ant attempted to interpose, and further 
erred in not applying the principal of equitable estoppel in 
lhe insttmt case and in not finding that the acts and conduct 
of the Pbintiff-Rcspondant, liARJ:ON BECKSTROM, did in fact 
''~'''"U tule a bnsis upon \•7hi.ch tbe Dt?fenclant-AppelLmt was 
entitled to rely and that the Plaintiff-Rcspondant should be 
:hcrefore estopped from asserting his claim to the property. 
Gn the ol her hand, should che Court not find that 
11-,, LvJ"''''" •_.,.,-,s ·;ni-riciLnt to ''''~inlain Lhat principal, though 
'l.;~ ·•n uLjl'L' 1 i ()11 l_u i.1H2 sale by i_h2 D~fcnde!nt-Appc::ll:H1t 
crl ''" , ,,,] y ,, ·ely \olhi ch uilght: Lo be :J\·,'a,~ded l~o I he Plaintiff 
"''' ,,1,,,-il,,;;,,n the J'l:lintiff-•'l.esponrhnt llr:lde lo the purchase 
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The Defendant-Appellant respectfully submits that 
the Court should reverse the decision of the Court below 
and hold that the Plaintiff has no interest in the subject 
property; or in the alternative that the Plaintiff-Respondanc 
be estopped from objecting to the sale of the property and 
be awarded only one-half of the purchflse price subject to an 
accounting of offsets as appropriate and equitable, or, in 
the alternative, that the matter be remitted to the Court 
below for a new trial. ~ 
v::---
DATED this _)___ day o~ ~ust, 1977. 
Ji~tl;_A;h 
J. l·lacArthur 1-Jright, 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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